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Abstract
This paper analyzes how drug approval procedures inﬂuence the incentives of
pharmaceutical ﬁrms to launch new drugs in the presence of international reference
pricing. First, we show that the set of countries in which a ﬁrm commercializes a new
drug is larger when countries do not approve this new drug simultaneously. We also
show that a ﬁrm's best response to international reference pricing is to never launch
a new drug sequentially as long as the diﬀerence in drug approval times between
countries is small enough. Furthermore, we show that a ﬁrm's incentives to launch
a new drug in one or another country are the same if the drug approval times are
identical across countries or if the diﬀerence between approval times are small enough.
However, we show that these incentives can change if the approval times diﬀerences
across countries are large enough.
Key-Words: Drug launch timing, sequential launching, marketing authorization,
international reference pricing.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes how drug approval procedures inﬂuence the incentives of pharma-
ceutical ﬁrms to launch new drugs in the presence of international reference pricing. The
focus is on the exogenous timing of drug approvals, the endogenous timing of launches
and on the regulated pricing of drugs. We leave apart the important issues of quality and
safety on the one hand and of incentives to innovate on the other hand, both sensitive to
the drug approval regulation.
Before launching a new drug on a market, a pharmaceutical ﬁrm must satisfy some
regulatory constraints. One important compulsory step is to obtain a marketing autho-
rization (MA). This authorization depends on the proof that the new drug complies with
safety, quality and eﬃcacy standards. In the US, the Food and Drug Administration is in
charge of approving new drugs. In the EU, four alternative procedures co-exist for drug
approval: the centralized procedure, the decentralized procedure, the national procedure
and the mutual recognition procedure [Eudralex, 2013]. The centralized procedure allows
ﬁrms to submit a single application to the European Medicines Agency to obtain a central-
ized MA valid in all EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.1 The decentralized
procedure may be used to obtain a MA in several Member States when the applicant does
not yet have a MA in any country. The national procedure is used to obtain a MA in
one country at a time or in the initial phase of the mutual recognition procedure. The
mutual recognition procedure is used to request a MA in EU countries for products that
have already received authorizations in other EU countries.
The distinctive feature between these procedures that motivates our analysis is whether
the drug is approved simultaneously in all countries or not. In the case of the EU, only the
1The centralized procedure is compulsory for all medicines derived from biotechnology and other high-
tech processes, as well as for human medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, cancer, diabetes, neurode-
generative diseases, auto-immune and other immune dysfunctions, and viral diseases, and for veterinary
medicines for use for growth or yield enhancers. The centralized procedure is also open to products that
bring a signiﬁcant therapeutic, scientiﬁc or technical innovation, or is in any other respect in the interest
of patient or animal health. As a result, the majority of genuinely novel medicines are authorized through
the European Medicines Agency.
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centralized procedure guarantees a simultaneous MA in all EU countries. In the alternative
three non-centralized procedures, new drugs do not necessarily obtain a MA simultaneously
in all countries. Once a MA is obtained, a drug producer can start commercializing its
new drugs at any time, but without exceeding three years (sunset clause). We show that
whether MAs are simultaneous or not can inﬂuence how pharmaceutical ﬁrms strategically
respond to international reference pricing. In particular, it inﬂuences whether and when
they launch a new drug in diﬀerent countries where they have a MA.
A second set of regulatory constraints that is crucial when launching a new drug and
after, refers to pricing rules. In fact, the system of patents together with the widespread
availability of health insurance (public or private) can induce excessively high pharmaceu-
tical prices in the absence of regulation. Therefore, many countries use some regulatory
tools to control the expenses related to the consumption of drugs.
One such regulation is the international reference pricing (IRP) in countries. An IRP
imposes a price cap based on prices of identical drugs in other reference countries. Almost
every EU country use IRPs. The IRP formula varies from one country to another. Some
use the lowest price observed in the reference countries while other use an average of the
reference prices. Countries can revise prices periodically and they choose to use foreign
prices retroactively or not, [Rankin, 2003]. The basket of reference countries varies in size
from one country to another. We observe that the sets of reference countries include an
increasing number of countries over time, [Leopold et al., 2012]. This regulation typically
induces a convergence between international drug prices. Moreover, many authors argue
that it gives incentives to pharmaceutical ﬁrms to sequentially launch new drugs, initiating
the sales in high-price countries, [Varol et al., 2012, among others].
In this article, our research interest is related to three streams of literature, which are,
to the best of our knowledge, disconnected from each other. First, concerning the approval
of new products, we can mention the existing literature on quality standards. However, as
far as we are aware of, there is hardly any mention to the centralization (or the lack thereof)
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of standard settings. Authors rather focus on the important issue of how organizations set
their standards where applicants decide to apply [Lerner and Tirole, 2006; Chiao et al.,
2007].
Second, closer to our purpose, is the literature on the architecture of organizations,
which focuses on the diﬀerences between committees, hierarchies and polyarchies [Sah
and Stiglitz, 1986, 1988]. Authors interestingly analyze the performance of each type of
structure in accepting or rejecting good-quality products and projects. However, they
ignore the possible inﬂuence of the structure on the strategic decisions of the applicants.
Third, the literature on IRPs is, up to our knowledge, mainly empirical. It repeatedly
provides evidence about the link between IRPs, interdependence of prices and timing of
new drugs launches. In particular, several authors show that price regulations such as IRPs
cause launch delays and even absence of launches in some countries, [Danzon and Epstein,
2008; Danzon et al., 2005; Kyle, 2007; Lanjouw, 2005; Rankin, 2003; Varol et al., 2012].
However, they do not explain why some launches are delayed in time while other launches
simply never occur in some countries. [Verniers et al., 2011], analyze launch delays for
drugs, considering that launch delays are a regulator's strategic decision rather than a
ﬁrm's one.
[Houy and Jelovac, 2014] is the only article to theoretically derive the optimal ﬁrms'
strategy of launch timing under diﬀerent modalities of IRPs and given some network struc-
ture that reﬂects the IRPs in all countries. It shows that, for a rather ﬂexible network
structure (a transitive one), ﬁrms respond to IRPs by never launching drugs sequentially
if IRPs are retroactive and prices are revised periodically. Instead, under these conditions,
ﬁrms are better oﬀ launching the new drug immediately in countries with a high will-
ingness to pay and never in the remaining ones. Counter-examples are also provided for
some speciﬁc network structures characterized by a very high connectivity of one country
in the network. An implicit assumption in [Houy and Jelovac, 2014] is the absence, or
equivalently, simultaneity, of MAs in all countries.
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In the present paper, we relax the assumption of simultaneous MAs in all countries.
Still, we continue focusing on retroactive IRPs with periodical price revisions. First, we
show that the set of countries in which a ﬁrm commercializes a new drug is larger when
countries do not approve this new drug simultaneously. Then, we show that a ﬁrm's
best response to IRPs is to never launch new drugs sequentially as long as the diﬀerences
in times necessary to obtain a MA between countries are small enough. Therefore, we
conﬁrm the main result of [Houy and Jelovac, 2014], for small diﬀerences in MA times.
Furthermore, we show that a ﬁrm's incentives to launch a new drug in one or another
country are the same no matter whether the MA times are simultaneous across countries
or if the approval times are close enough. However, we show that these incentives can
change if the diﬀerences between approvals times increase. In particular, it can be optimal
for a ﬁrm not to launch a new drug in a low-price country if the approval times are close
enough between high-price and low-price countries. However, it can be optimal to launch
the drug in the low-price countries as well if the latter approve the drug early enough
compared to the other countries.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the formal
framework. We provide an illustrative example in Section 3. In Section 4, we derive general
results on optimal pricing. In Section 5, we analyze the eﬀect of approval times. Section 6
concludes. Proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Formal framework
We consider the optimal price vectors for a monopolistic ﬁrm oﬀering a new drug for
the international market. The patent that protects any new drug justiﬁes the monopolistic
position of the ﬁrm. With no lack of generality, we consider that the cost of production
for the drug is null. Buyers are countries or the health authorities in each of the countries.
Let N = (1, ..., N) be the set of countries.2 We assume that the drug is sold in all countries
2With a slight lack a rigor, but with no risk of confusion, N is both the set of countries and its
cardinality.
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with perfect segmentation. Said diﬀerently, there is no parallel imports.
Each country i has a willingness to pay (WTP), wi, that is the price above which it
is not willing to buy the drug under any circumstances. Let (w1, ..., wN) ∈ R+∗N be the
WTPs for all countries.3
Each country i is also characterized by a market size (MS), ωi. This is the quantity the
seller can sell in country i if country i buys the drug. Let (ω1, ..., ωN) ∈ R+∗N be the MSs
for all countries.4
Finally, each country i allows the monopoly to enter its market only after mi ∈ N
periods corresponding to the time needed for all processes of authorization, application,
referring, ﬁling, approval, etc in country i. Let (m1, ...,mN) ∈ N be the Approval Times
(ATs) for all countries.
The problem of the monopolistic seller is to maximize its intertemporal proﬁt over the
price vectors (pti)i∈N,t∈N where ∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ N, pti ∈ R+ is the price set in country i at time
t. Let P be the set of all possible price vectors. Notice that, obviously, we allow for prices
that would change over time and countries.
We consider that all countries are part of the same complete international reference
pricing system, hence all IRPs are complete.5 IRPs are retroactive, they are based on
the lowest price abroad and prices can be revised over time. Then, given a price vector
(pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P , for any period t, the demand in country i is ωi if the following conditions
are all met:
1. t ≥ mi. If this condition is not met, the drug is not approved in country i and cannot
enter the market.
2. pti ≤ wi. If this condition is not met, the price of the drug in country i is higher than
3As a general remark, we use superscripts for time indices and subscripts for country indices. R+
denotes the set of all positive real numbers. R+∗ denotes the set of all strictly positive real numbers. N
denotes the set of all positive integers.
4Notice that, with no loss of generality, we do not consider countries with null WTP or MS. Such
countries can just be considered nonexistent by the seller.
5For a thorough study of incomplete IRPs, see [Houy and Jelovac, 2014].
6
the WTP of this country.
3. if t > 0, pti ≤ mini′∈N,t′<t pt′i′ . This condition corresponds to the constraint imposed
by the IRPs. We do not explicitly model the bargaining process between the seller
and the buyer but consider, in line with what is observed in reality, that country
i can impose that the price at which the drug is sold in its territory be not higher
than any price ever observed in any country since its IRP is complete (every country
references each others' prices when available).
If any of the previous conditions is not met, the quantity sold at time t, in country i is
null.6 For any price vector P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P , we deﬁne the set of countries where the
drug is sold at time t as St(P ). Formally,
Definition 1
∀P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P , St(P ) = {i ∈ N, t ≥ mi and pti ≤ wi and [t > 0 ⇒ pti ≤
mini′∈N,t′<t pt
′
i′ ]}.
Then, the intertemporal proﬁt earned by the monopolistic seller is given by
Π(P ) =
∑
t∈N
βt
∑
i∈St(P )
ptiωi,
where 0 < β < 1 is the time discount rate. Let P a ⊆ P be the set of price vectors
maximizing the seller's proﬁt,
P a = arg max
P∈P
Π(P ).
3 Illustrative examples
Let us consider the monopolistic producer of a new drug. We assume that the producer
has no inﬂuence on the approval procedure, that is, on the ATs. However, the producer can
choose whether and when to commercialize the drug in a country. In our examples, two
countries have diﬀerent WTPs for the new drug and diﬀerent MSs. In order to illustrate
6We will say that the drug is sold in a country when the quantity sold is strictly positive.
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the eﬀect of diﬀerent ATs on the optimal ﬁrm's strategy, we impose that the only diﬀerence
between the three examples given below lies in the values for the ATs.
Example 1
Let us consider a set of 2 countries: N = (1, 2) with WTPs (w1, w2) = (1, 3), with MSs
(ω1, ω2) = (5, 3) and with ATs (m1,m2) = (0, 0). Let β = 0.9.
If the ﬁrm sells the drug in both countries from the very start, it does so at prices equal
to 1 and 3 in Countries 1 and 2, respectively, during the initial period so as to fully extract
the countries' surplus. IRPs becomes eﬀective after one period, so that prices are equal to
1 in both countries from then on. Hence, the ﬁrm's intertemporal proﬁt is
[(1× 5) + (3× 3)] + 0.9
1− 0.9 × [(1× 5) + (1× 3)] = 86.
If the ﬁrm sells the drug in country 2 only from the start and forever, its intertemporal
proﬁt is
1
1− 0.9 × (3× 3) = 90.
In this example, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ selling in country 2 only. In fact, the gains from
selling in country 1 are not worth the losses from spreading the low price of country 1
to country 2. Furthermore, according to [Houy and Jelovac, 2014], it is never optimal to
sequentially launch the drug under the conditions of Example 1. In particular, there is no
reason to start selling the drug in country 1 at a later date for example.
Now consider Example 2 with a slightly larger AT time in country 2.
Example 2
Let us consider a set of 2 countries: N = (1, 2) with WTPs (w1, w2) = (1, 3), with MSs
(ω1, ω2) = (5, 3) and with ATs (m1,m2) = (0, 1). Let β = 0.9.
Again, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to sell in country 2 only. In fact, its intertemporal
proﬁt from selling in both countries as soon as the drug is approved, is
(1× 5) + 0.9
1− 0.9 × [(1× 5) + (1× 3)] = 77.
8
If instead, the ﬁrm sells in country 2 only and as soon as possible, the ﬁrm's intertemporal
proﬁt is
0.9
1− 0.9 × (3× 3) = 81.
IRPs takes exactly one period of time to be eﬀective. If the ﬁrm sells in country 1 from
the start, the low price of country 1 spreads to country 2 exactly at the time of approval
in country 2. This spreading of the low price would have happened at the same time if
country 2 had approved the drug at the initial period. Therefore, the trade-oﬀ identiﬁed in
Example 1 between selling in one additional market and spreading a low price in country 2
applies equally. The only diﬀerence with Example 1 is the absence of proﬁt from country
2 in the initial period, no matter whether the ﬁrm sells in country 1 or not. In Example
1, this initial proﬁt from country 2 was equal to 9, no matter whether there are sales in
country 1 or not. Therefore, earning this proﬁt of 9 or not is irrelevant for the comparison.
Incentives are equivalent in Examples 1 and 2, and whatever strategy is optimal for the
ﬁrm in Example 1 continues to be optimal in Example 2.
Last, we consider Example 3 with ATs that are diﬀerent enough so that the optimal
strategy of the ﬁrm changes.
Example 3
Let us consider a set of 2 countries: N = (1, 2) with WTPs (w1, w2) = (1, 3), with MSs
(ω1, ω2) = (5, 3) and with ATs (m1,m2) = (0, 2). Let β = 0.9.
In example 3, if the ﬁrm sells in both countries as soon as it can, its intertemporal
proﬁt is
(1 + 0.9)× (1× 5) + (0.9)
2
1− 0.9 × [(1× 5) + (1× 3)] = 74.3.
Instead, if the ﬁrm sells in country 2 only, it earns
(0.9)2
1− 0.9 × (3× 3) = 72.9.
Conversely to the case in Examples 1 and 2, it is now optimal for the ﬁrm to sell
in both countries as soon as the market authorization is delivered. The basic trade-oﬀ
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between sales in one additional market against the spreading of a low price through IRPs
is modiﬁed in favor of the country with an early market authorization. The reason here
is that the gains from selling in an additional market concern a higher number of periods
while the losses from spreading a low price through IRPs does not vary.
4 General results on optimal price vectors
The purpose of our study is to draw some conclusions about the eﬀect of ATs on the
set of countries in which the drug will be launched. In order to do that, we ﬁrst need to
derive some properties about the price vectors.
The following proposition is a generalization in the case with diﬀerent ATs of a result
already stated in [Houy and Jelovac, 2014]. It states that when the drug is launched by
the seller in a country, it is never withdrawn from this country afterward.
Proposition 1
Let P ∈ P a. ∀t ∈ N, St(P ) ⊆ St+1(P ).
Intuitively, for the seller, the eﬀect of launching the drug in a country is to sell more
at the potential cost of selling at a lower price in other countries. Since the IRPs consider
all past prices, selling at a point in time in a country already sets a reference price for the
future. Hence, withdrawing the drug in the future consists only in losing MS.
We can deﬁne, for a given optimal price vector P ∈ P a, S(P ) as the set of countries in
which the drug is launched at some point in time. Formally,
Definition 2
∀P ∈ P a, S(P ) = {i ∈ N,∃t ∈ N, i ∈ St(P )}.
Because the set of countries in which the drug is launched can only grow larger in time,
and because the set of countries we consider is ﬁnite, there exists a point in time after
which, S(P ) is exactly the set of countries in which the drug is ever sold.
The following proposition states that there is monotonicity in the set of countries in
which the drug is sold at each period. Hence, if the drug is sold in period t in country i
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and if country j's WTP is greater that country i's, then the drug should also be sold in
country j. Of course, this results is conditional on the approval process to be completed
in country j.
Proposition 2
Let P ∈ P a. Let i ∈ N, t ∈ N be such that i ∈ St(P ). Let j ∈ N be such that wi ≤ wj and
mj ≤ t. Then, j ∈ St(P ).
Intuitively, if the drug is sold in country i with a lowest WTP than country j's, then,
setting the same price in country j as in country i implies selling larger quantities (after
j's AT) without having any eﬀect on future sales and prices through IRPs.
Finally, the following proposition states that for some optimal price vector and for any
period t, there is no entry in any market in period t if no country has an AT exactly equal
to t. Then, any launching period corresponds to an AT in a country. Notice that, possibly,
launching can occur in country i when market becomes available in country j 6= i (i.e at
j's AT).
Proposition 3
∃P ∈ P a,∀t ∈ N, [{i ∈ N,mi = t} = ∅ and t > 0]⇒ St−1(P ) = St(P ).
Notice that Proposition 3 states that the condition regarding ATs and launching periods
is imposed for at least one but not all optimal price vectors. The reason is the following.
Consider for the sake of the illustration the following example.
Example 4
Let us consider 2 countries, N = (1, 2) with WTPs (1, 2), MSs (9, 10) and ATs (0, 0). Let
β = 0.9.
It is straightforward, following Proposition 3 to check that the following price vector
P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P is optimal if ∀i ∈ N,∀t ∈ N, pti = 2. In this case, ∀t ∈ N, St(P ) = {2}
and Π(P ) = 200. However, let us have P ′ = (p′ti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P deﬁned by
∀i ∈ N,∀t ∈ N, p′ti =

2 , if t = 0
2 , if t = 1 and i = 2
1 , otherwise
.
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It is straightforward to check that Π(P ′) = 200. Hence, P ′ is also optimal with S0(P ) = {2}
and ∀t > 0 ∈ N, St(P ) = {1, 2}. In this case, the conditions stated in Proposition 3 are
not satisﬁed for P ′. The reason is the following. Example 4 describes a very particular
situation where the loss suﬀered by the seller in terms of price decreasing in country 2 in
order to sell in country 1 is exactly equal to the surplus proﬁt earned from increasing the
MS. In this particular case, the launching in country 1 can be implemented at any point
in time without losing proﬁt and hence is not conditional on the AT in another country.
These are the only cases for which Proposition 3 does not generalize to all optimal price
vectors.
5 The eﬀect of Approval Times
We will now derive some results regarding the sets of countries in which the drug is
ever launched and the eﬀect of ATs on this set. First, let us consider the sets of countries
in which the drug is ever launched when all ATs are null and the seller is constrained to
launch the drug in the same countries at each period. Formally, if S0 is the set of these
sets, we have,
Definition 3
S0 = arg max
S⊆N
∑
i∈S
wiωi +
β
1− β
(
min
i∈S
wi
)(∑
i∈S
ωi
)
.
The following two propositions show that S0 is exactly the set of sets of countries in
which the drug is ever launched when all ATs are null. Then, the constraint that the drug
should be launched in the same countries at each period that we considered in order to
deﬁne S0 is not a binding one.
Proposition 4
Assume ∀i ∈ N,mi = 0. ∀S ∈ S0,∃P ∈ P a, S(P ) = S.
Proposition 5
Assume ∀i ∈ N,mi = 0. ∀P ∈ P a, S(P ) ∈ S0.
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The intuition is the same as the one we gave in Example 4. As we stated, in the case
where all ATs are null, the only reason why we could have a launch in a country after
period 0 is when the decrease in price it induces for the sales in the other countries is
exactly compensated by the gain in MS. But then, it is also optimal for the seller to launch
the drug in this country from period 0.
Proposition 6 shows that when ATs are not necessarily all null, the set of countries in
which the drug is sold can only be larger than in the case where all ATs are null. Said
diﬀerently, diﬀerences in ATs increase the set of countries in which a new drug is launched.
Proposition 6
∀P ∈ P a, ∃S ∈ S0, S ⊆ S(P ).
The following two propositions generalize Propositions 4 and 5 when all the ATs are
either null or unity. Then, S0 is exactly the set of sets of countries in which the drug is ever
launched when all ATs are null or when they are all 0 or 1. Including a 1 period delay in
the ATs for some countries has no eﬀect on which countries the seller will choose optimally
to ever launch the drug. The reason is that it takes exactly one period of time for prices
to spread into the countries where they ever spread when the IRPs are complete.
Proposition 7
Assume {t ∈ N,∃i ∈ N,mi = t} = {0, 1}. ∀P ∈ P a, S(P ) ∈ S0.
Proposition 8
Assume {t ∈ N,∃i ∈ N,mi = t} = {0, 1}. ∀S ∈ S0,∃P ∈ P a, S(P ) = S.
Now the natural question that is raised by the previous results is the following: if
extending the ATs by at most 1 period in some countries does not change the countries
in which the drug is launched, would the same result hold for more than one period AT
extension? Examples 1 and 3 in Section 3 show that the answer to this question is negative.
In Example 1, the product is launched in country 2 only for a proﬁt of 90 (proﬁt of 86 if
launched in both countries). In Example 3, the product is launched in both countries for
a proﬁt of 74.3 (proﬁt of 72.9 if launched only in country 2).
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6 Conclusion
This paper extends [Houy and Jelovac, 2014], considering that drug ATs are not nec-
essarily equal across countries. Concretely, we analyze the inﬂuence of drug ATs on the
optimal launching strategies of pharmaceutical ﬁrms when prices are regulated according
to an international reference pricing policy.
We conﬁrm the main result of [Houy and Jelovac, 2014], for drug approvals that are
close to each other in time. More precisely, when all drug approvals are either simultaneous
or one period of time diﬀerent, a pharmaceutical ﬁrm has no incentive to sequentially
launch its new drugs in diﬀerent countries. Instead, it optimally launches its products in
high-WTP countries as soon as they are approved there. It never launches drugs in other
countries to avoid spreading a low price to the high-WTP countries through IRPs.
However, as the time diﬀerences between drug approvals increase above one period of
time, the conclusions drastically change. The ﬁrm faces diﬀerent incentives when deciding
whether to launch a new drug in a country or not. In particular, if a low-WTP country
delivers a market authorization early enough compared to high-WTP countries, the ﬁrm
can be better-oﬀ commercializing the drug in the low-WTP countries too, even if it spreads
a low price to other countries through IRPs. Moreover, we show that the number of coun-
tries in which the ﬁrm optimally commercializes its products is higher when the diﬀerences
between market authorization times exceeds one period of time.
We have performed this analysis keeping approval times exogenous. Our results seem-
ingly provide one argument against the centralization of the market authorization proce-
dures if the objective is that drugs be launched in the largest possible set of countries.
Hence, we expect that low-WTP countries have an incentive to speed up their market ap-
proval procedure to increase their chance of having new drugs on their market. However,
this incentive might bring safety issues along if countries accelerate their approval proce-
dures at the expense of an adequate safety testing. Extending our research questions to
an endogenous market authorization timing, together with endogenous and costly safety
14
controls constitutes an interesting avenue for future research.
We can also think of another extension for future research if relaxing an implicit as-
sumptions of our model. We considered that the marketing authorizations are constraints
for pharmaceutical ﬁrms only because they impose delays in the launching sequence. Ob-
viously, there also exists a risk dimension in this applied problem. Indeed, submitting a ﬁle
for approval in a country is risky and the outcome can always be negative. If we consider
that this risk is independent across countries and make the time decision to seek approval
an endogenous variable, the optimal approval application strategy is obviously to apply for
a marketing authorization in all countries as soon as possible since this strategy is one that
leads to the least binding constraints for the launching sequence. Then, in this setting,
our assumption of exogenous application timing has no strength. However, if we consider
more realistically that the approval decision risk is dependent across countries, then, the
application sequence is not trivial and interferes with the launching sequence.
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A Proofs
Let us set the following deﬁnitions:
• let w = maxi∈N wi be the largest WTP for all countries,
• let m = maxi∈N mi be the maximum AT for all countries,
• let ∀A ⊆ N,wA = mini∈Awi be the minimum WTP for the subset of countries in A.
Lemma 1
Let P ∈ P a. ∃t ∈ N, St(P ) 6= ∅.
Proof of Lemma 1: Let us have  ∈ R such that 0 <  < wN . Let us deﬁne P ′ =
(p′ti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P be such that ∀i ∈ N,∀t ∈ N, p′ti = . By deﬁnition, ∀i ∈ N,∀t ≥ mi, i ∈
St(P ′) and then Π(P ′) > 0. By deﬁnition, ∀P ∈ P a,Π(P ) ≥ Π(P ′) > 0. 
Lemma 2
Let P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P a. ∀t ∈ N,∀i ∈ N, pti > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2: Assume it is not the case. Let T ∈ N be such that ∃i ∈ N, pTi = 0.
Let us have  ∈ R+∗ such that 0 <  < wN . Let P ′ = (p′t′i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ∈ N, p′t′i′ =
{
 , if pt
′
i′ < 
pt
′
i′ , otherwise
.
Let i ∈ S0(P ). By deﬁnition, pti ≤ wi. Then, since  < wN , p′ti ≤ wi which implies
i ∈ S0(P ′).
Let i ∈ St(P ) with t > 0. By deﬁnition, pti ≤ wi and pti ≤ mini′∈N,t′<t pt′i′ . Then, since
 < wN , p
′t
i ≤ wi. Moreover, it is straightforward to check that p′ti ≤ mini′∈N,t′<t p′ti. Hence,
i ∈ St(P ′).
Π(P ) =
∑
t≤T
βt
∑
i∈St(P )
ptiωi +
∑
t>T
βt
∑
i∈St(P )
ptiωi . By what we showed,
∑
t≤T
βt
∑
i∈St(P )
ptiωi ≤∑
t≤T
βt
∑
i∈St(P ′)
p′tiωi and it is straightforward to check that
∑
t>T
βt
∑
i∈St(P )
ptiωi = 0 <
∑
t>T
βt
∑
i∈St(P ′)
p′tiωi.
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Then, Π(P ′) > Π(P ) which contradicts the assumption that P ∈ P a. 
Definition 4
Let P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P, MP ti (P ) ∈ R+ is deﬁned as follows
MP ti (P ) =
{
min(wi,mini′∈N,t′<t pt
′
i′) , if t > 0
wi , if t = 0
.
Proof of Proposition 1: Assume it is not the case. Let i ∈ N, t ∈ N be such that
i ∈ St(P ) and i /∈ St+1(P ). Let P ′ = (p′t′i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ∈ N, p′t′i′ =
{
mini′′∈N,t′′<t+1 pi
′′
t′′ , if i
′ = i and t′ = t+ 1
pt
′
i′ , otherwise
.
By deﬁnition, ∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ≤ t+ 1,MP t′i′ (P ) = MP t′i′ (P ′).
i ∈ St(P ) implies pti ≤ wi and t ≥ mi. Hence, i /∈ St+1(P ) implies pt+1i > mini′′∈N,t′′<t+1 pi′′t′′ =
p′t+1i . Then ∀t′ ≥ t + 1 ∈ N, ∀i′ ∈ N, pt′i′ ≥ p′t
′
i′ . Then, ∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ > t + 1,MP t′i′ (P ) ≥
MP t
′
i′ (P
′).
Moreover, ∀t′ > t+ 1,
min
i′′∈N,t′′<t′
p′t
′′
i′′ =
min( min
i′′∈N,t′′<t+1
p′t
′′
i′′ , min
i′′∈N
p′t+1i′′ , min
i′′∈N,t′>t′′>t+1
p′t
′′
i′′) =
min( min
i′′∈N,t′′<t+1
pt
′′
i′′ , min
i′′∈N
p′t+1i′′ , min
i′′∈N,t′>t′′>t+1
pt
′′
i′′) =
min( min
i′′∈N,t′′<t+1
pt
′′
i′′ , min
i′′∈N\{i}
p′t+1i′′ , p
′t+1
i , min
i′′∈N,t′>t′′>t+1
pt
′′
i′′) =
min( min
i′′∈N,t′′<t+1
pt
′′
i′′ , min
i′′∈N\{i}
pt+1i′′ , min
i′′∈N,t′>t′′>t+1
pt
′′
i′′) ≥
min
i′′∈N,t′′<t′
pt
′′
i′′ .
Hence, ∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ > t+ 1,MP t′i′ (P ) ≤MP t′i′ (P ′).
Then, ∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ > t+ 1,MP t′i′ (P ) = MP t′i′ (P ′).
Then, ∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ∈ N,MP t′i′ (P ) = MP t′i′ (P ′). Hence, ∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ∈ N, [i′ 6= i or t′ 6=
t]⇒ [i′ ∈ St′(P ′)⇔ i′ ∈ St′(P )].
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i ∈ St(P ) implies pti ≤ wi and t ≥ mi. pti ≤ wi implies p′t+1i ≤ wi. Then, by deﬁnition,
p′t+1i ≤MP t+1i (P ′). Then, i ∈ St+1(P ′).
Then, by Lemma 2, Π(P ′) > Π(P ) which contradicts the fact that P ∈ P a. 
Lemma 3
Let P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P a. ∀i ∈ St(P ),∀t ∈ N, pti = MP ti (P ).
Proof of Lemma 3: Assume it is not the case. Let i ∈ N and t ∈ N be such
that pti 6= MP ti (P ). By deﬁnition, if pti > MP ti (P ), then, i /∈ St(P ) contradicting the
assumptions. Then, assume pti < MP
t
i (P ). Let P
′ = (p′t
′
i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ ∈ N, p′t′i′ =
{
MP ti (P ) , if i
′ = i and t′ = t
pt
′
i′ , otherwise
.
By deﬁnition, since we assumed pti < MP
t
i (P ) = p
′t
i, ∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ ∈ N,MP t′i′ (P ) ≤
MP t
′
i′ (P
′) and hence, ∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ ∈ N, [i′ 6= i or t′ 6= t]⇒ [i′ ∈ St′(P )⇒ i′ ∈ St′(P ′)].
By deﬁnition, i ∈ St(P ) implies t ≥ mi. Besides, by deﬁnition of P ′, p′ti ≤ MP ti (P ).
Hence, i ∈ St′(P ′).
Hence, it is straightforward to check that Π(P ′) > Π(P ), contradicting the assumption
stating P ∈ P a. 
Lemma 4
Let P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P a. ∀i ∈ S0(P ), p0i = wi.
Proof of Lemma 4: By Lemma 3. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume it is not the case, i.e. j /∈ St(P ). Let P ′ =
(p′t
′
i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ∈ N, p′t′i′ =
{
MP tj (P ) , if i
′ = j and t′ = t
pt
′
i′ , otherwise
.
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By deﬁnition, ∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ≤ t,MP t′i′ (P ) = MP t′i′ (P ′).
Moreover, since by assumption, mj ≤ t, j /∈ St(P ) implies ptj > MP tj (P ). Hence,
ptj > p
′t
j. Then, by deﬁnition, ∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ > t,MP t′i′ (P ) ≥MP t′i′ (P ′).
Moreover, ∀t′ > t,
min
i′′∈N,t′′<t′
p′t
′′
i′′ =
min( min
i′′∈N,t′′<t
p′t
′′
i′′ , min
i′′∈N
p′ti′′ , min
i′′∈N,t′>t′′>t
p′t
′′
i′′) =
min( min
i′′∈N,t′′<t
pt
′′
i′′ , min
i′′∈N
p′ti′′ , min
i′′∈N,t′>t′′>t
pt
′′
i′′) =
min( min
i′′∈N,t′′<t
pt
′′
i′′ , min
i′′∈N\{i,j}
p′ti′′ , p
′t
j, p
′t
i, min
i′′∈N,t′>t′′>t+1
pt
′′
i′′) =
min( min
i′′∈N,t′′<t
pt
′′
i′′ , min
i′′∈N\{i,j}
pti′′ , p
′t
j, p
t
i, min
i′′∈N,t′>t′′>t+1
pt
′′
i′′).
However, since wi ≤ wj,MP ti (P ) ≤MP tj (P ). By Lemma 3, since i ∈ St(P ), pti = MP ti (P ).
Then, pti = MP
t
i (P ) ≤MP tj (P ) = p′tj. Then,
min
i′′∈N,t′′<t′
p′t
′′
i′′ =
min( min
i′′∈N,t′′<t
pt
′′
i′′ , min
i′′∈N\{i,j}
pti′′ , p
t
i, min
i′′∈N,t′>t′′>t+1
pt
′′
i′′) ≥
min
i′′∈N,t′′<t′
pt
′′
i′′ .
Hence, ∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ > t,MP t′i′ (P ) ≤MP t′i′ (P ′).
Then, ∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ > t,MP t′i′ (P ) = MP t′i′ (P ′). Hence, ∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ ∈ N, [i′ 6= j or t′ 6=
t]⇒ [i′ ∈ St′(P ′)⇔ i′ ∈ St′(P )].
Since by assumption, t ≥ mj and by deﬁnition of P ′, p′tj ≤MP tj (P ) = MP tj (P ′), then,
j ∈ St(P ′).
Then, using Lemma 2, Π(P ′) > Π(P ) which contradicts the fact that P ∈ P a. 
In the following, we will use an arbitrary strictly positive number δ ∈ R+∗.
Definition 5
Let P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P a. P˜ = (p˜ti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P is deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ ∈ N, p˜t′i′ =
{
pt
′
i′ , if i
′ ∈ St′(P )
w + δ , if i′ /∈ St′(P ) .
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Lemma 5
Let ∀P ∈ P a, ∀t ∈ N, St(P˜ ) = St(P ).
Proof of Lemma 5: Let P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P a. By deﬁnition, P˜ = (p˜t′i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P
satisﬁes
∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ∈ N, p˜t′i′ =
{
pt
′
i′ , if i
′ ∈ St′(P )
w + δ , if i′ /∈ St′(P ) .
Let i ∈ N, t ∈ N such that i ∈ St(P ). Then, by deﬁnition, t ≥ mi, pti ≤ wi and hence
p˜ti ≤ wi. Then, if t = 0, i ∈ St(P˜ ). Assume t > 0. i ∈ St(P ) implies
pti = p˜
t
i ≤ min
i′∈N,t′<t
(pt
′
i′ , wi)
p˜ti ≤ min
t′<t
( min
i′∈St′ (P )
pt
′
i′ , min
i′ /∈St′ (P )
pt
′
i′ , wi) = min
t′<t
( min
i′∈St′ (P )
p˜t
′
i′ , min
i′ /∈St′ (P )
pt
′
i′ , wi)
p˜ti ≤ min
t′<t
( min
i′∈St′ (P )
p˜t
′
i′ , wi) = min
t′<t
( min
i′∈St′ (P )
p˜t
′
i′ , w + δ, wi)
p˜ti ≤ min
t′<t,i′∈N
(p˜t
′
i′ , wi)
Then, since t ≥ mi, i ∈ St(P˜ ).
Let i ∈ N, t ∈ N be such that i /∈ St(P ). Then, by deﬁnition, p˜ti = w + δ > wi which
implies i /∈ St(P˜ ). 
Lemma 6
Let ∀P ∈ P a, P˜ ∈ P a.
Proof of Lemma 6: Follows directly from the deﬁnition of P˜ and Lemma 5. 
Lemma 7
∀P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P a,∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ N,
1. t = 0⇒ [i ∈ St(P )⇒ pti = wi],
2. t > 0⇒ [i ∈ St(P )⇒ pti = min(wi,mint′<t,i′∈St′ (P )wi′)].
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Proof of Lemma 7: 1 follows directly from Lemma 3.
Let us prove 2. By Lemma 6, P˜ ∈ P a. Then, by Lemma 3, ∀t ∈ N,∀i ∈ N, i ∈ St(P˜ )⇒
p˜ti = MP
t
i (P˜ ). By recursivity, it is straightforward to check that ∀t ∈ N,∀i ∈ N,MP ti (P˜ ) =
min(wi,mint′<t,i′∈St′ (P˜ )wi′). By Lemma 5, ∀t ∈ N, St(P˜ ) = St(P ). Moreover, by deﬁnition,
∀t ∈ N, ∀i ∈ N, i ∈ St(P ) ⇒ pti = p˜ti. Then, ∀t ∈ N,∀i ∈ N, i ∈ St(P ) ⇒ pit = p˜ti =
MP ti (P˜ ) = min(wi,mint′<t,i′∈St′ (P )wi′). 
Lemma 8
∃P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P a,∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ N,
1. i /∈ St(P )⇒ pti = w + δ,
2. t = 0⇒ [i ∈ St(P )⇒ pti = wi],
3. t > 0⇒ [i ∈ St(P )⇒ pti = min(wi,mint′<t,i′∈St′ (P )wi′)].
Proof of Lemma 8: Let P ∈ P a. By Lemma 6, P˜ ∈ P a. Then, by Lemma 7, P˜ satisﬁes
2 and 3. Moreover, by deﬁnition, P˜ satisﬁes 1. 
Definition 6
Let P ∗ ⊆ P a be the subset of optimal price vectors such that ∀P ∈ P ∗,
1. i /∈ St(P )⇒ pti = w + δ,
2. t = 0⇒ [i ∈ St(P )⇒ pti = wi],
3. t > 0⇒ [i ∈ St(P )⇒ pti = min(wi,mint′<t,i′∈St′ (P )wi′)].
Lemma 9
P ∗ 6= ∅.
Proof of Lemma 9: By Lemma 8. 
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Lemma 10
∀P ∈ P ∗, ∃P ′ ∈ P ∗,∀t ∈ N, t > m⇒ St−1(P ′) = St(P ′) = S(P ).
Proof of Lemma 10: Let P ∈ P ∗ ⊆ P a. By deﬁnition, P satisﬁes ∀i ∈ N,∀t ∈ N,
• i /∈ St(P )⇒ pti = w + δ,
• t = 0⇒ [i ∈ St(P )⇒ pti = wi],
• t > 0⇒ [i ∈ St(P )⇒ pti = min(wi,mint′<t,i′∈St′ (P )wi′)].
Let T > m be the latest period for which ST−1(P ) 6= ST (P ). If T is not deﬁned, the proof
is complete. By Proposition 1, ST−1(P ) ⊂ ST (P ). Let us deﬁne A = ST−1(P )\ST (P ) 6= ∅.
Let P ′ = (p′t
′
i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ∈ N, p′t′i′ =

wi′ , if i
′ ∈ A and t′ = T − 1
mini∈ST (P )wi , if i′ ∈ ST (P ) and t′ = T
pt
′
i′ , otherwise
.
It is straightforward to check that
Π(P )− Π(P ′) =
(βT − βT−1)
(∑
i∈A
wiωi
)
+βT
(
wST−1(P ) − wST (P )
) ∑
i∈ST−1(P )
ωi
−βTwST (P )
∑
i∈A
ωi.
Moreover, P ∈ P a implies Π(P )− Π(P ′) ≥ 0. Then,
∑
i∈A
wiωi ≤ β
1− β
(wST−1(P ) − wST (P ))
 ∑
i∈ST−1(P )
ωi

−wST (P )
(∑
i∈A
ωi
)]
.
(1)
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Now, let P ′′ = (p′′t
′
i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ ∈ N, p′′t′i′ =

w + δ , if i′ ∈ A and t′ ≥ T
wST−1(P ) , if i
′ ∈ ST−1(P ) and t′ ≥ T + 1
pt
′
i′ , otherwise
.
It is straightforward to check that
Π(P )− Π(P ′′) =
βT
(∑
i∈A
wiωi
)
+
βT+1
1− β
 ∑
i∈ST (P )
wST (P )ωi −
∑
i∈ST−1(P )
wST−1(P )ωi

Moreover, P ∈ P a implies Π(P )− Π(P ′′) ≥ 0. Then,
∑
i∈A
wiωi ≥ β
1− β
(wST−1(P ) − wST (P ))
 ∑
i∈ST−1(P )
ωi

−wST (P )
(∑
i∈A
ωi
)]
.
(2)
Using Equations 1 and 2, we have
∑
i∈A
wiωi =
β
1− β
(wST−1(P ) − wST (P ))
 ∑
i∈ST−1(P )
ωi

−wST (P )
(∑
i∈A
ωi
)]
.
And then, Π(P ) = Π(P ′). Then, P ′ ∈ P a. Moreover, it is straightforward to check that
P ′ ∈ P ∗ and S(P ′) = S(P ). Let T ′ > m be the latest period for which ST−1(P ′) 6= ST (P ′).
If T ′ is not deﬁned, the proof is complete. If T ′ < T is deﬁned, repeat the previous steps
of the proof a ﬁnite number of times until T ′ is not deﬁned. 
Lemma 11
∃P ∈ P ∗,∀t ∈ N, [{i ∈ N,mi = t} = ∅ and t > 0]⇒ St−1(P ) = St(P ).
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Proof of Lemma 11: Let us deﬁne P ∗∗ = {P ∈ P ∗,∀t > m, St−1(P ) = St(P )}.
By Lemmas 9 and 10, P ∗∗ 6= ∅. Assume that ∀P ∈ P ∗∗,∃t < m, [{i ∈ N,mi = t} =
∅ and St−1(P ) 6= St(P )]. ∀P ∈ P ∗∗, let #T (P ) = #{t < m, [{i ∈ N,mi = t} =
∅ and St−1(P ) 6= St(P )]}. By assumption, ∀P ∈ P ∗∗,#T (P ) ≥ 1. Moreover, by since
m is ﬁnite, ∀P ∈ P ∗∗, #T (P ) is ﬁnite. By Proposition 1, ∀P ∈ P ∗∗, ∀t ∈ N, St−1(P ) 6=
St(P ) ⇒ St−1(P ) ⊂ St(P ). Let P ∈ P ∗∗ be such that ∀P ′ ∈ P ∗∗,#T (P ′) ≥ #T (P )
and #T (P ′) = #T (P ) ⇒ max{t < m, [{i ∈ N,mi = t} = ∅ and St−1(P ) 6= St(P )]} ≥
max{t < m, [{i ∈ N,mi = t} = ∅ and St−1(P ′) 6= St(P ′)]}. Let T = max{t < m, [{i ∈
N,mi = t} = ∅ and St−1(P ) 6= St(P )]} be the latest period for which [{i ∈ N,mi = T} =
∅ and ST−1(P ) 6= ST (P )] is satisﬁed. By assumption, T < m.
Let us deﬁne A = ST−1(P ) \ ST (P ) 6= ∅. Let P ′ = (p′t′i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ∈ N, p′t′i′ =

wi′ , if i
′ ∈ A and t′ = T − 1
mini∈ST (P )wi , if i′ ∈ ST (P ) and t′ = T
pt
′
i′ , otherwise
.
It is straightforward to check that
Π(P )− Π(P ′) =
(βT − βT−1)
(∑
i∈A
wiωi
)
+βT
(
wST−1(P ) − wST (P )
) ∑
i∈ST−1(P )
ωi
−βTwST (P )
∑
i∈A
ωi.
Moreover, P ∈ P a implies Π(P )− Π(P ′) ≥ 0. Then,
∑
i∈A
wiωi ≤ β
1− β
(wST−1(P ) − wST (P ))
 ∑
i∈ST−1(P )
ωi

−wST (P )
(∑
i∈A
ωi
)]
.
(3)
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Now, let us deﬁne S+ = {i ∈ N,mi ≤ T + 1 and wi ≥ wST−1(P )} \ ST−1(P ) and
A+ = {i ∈ N,mi ≤ T + 1 and wi ≥ wST (P ) and wi < wST−1(P )} \ A. Notice that A+ and
S+ can be empty. Let P ′′ = (p′′t
′
i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ ∈ N, p′′t′i′ =

w + δ , if i′ ∈ A and t′ = T
wST−1(P ) , if i
′ ∈ S+ ∪ ST−1(P ) and t′ = T + 1
w′i , if i
′ ∈ A+ ∪ A and t′ = T + 1
pt
′
i′ , otherwise
.
It is straightforward to check that
Π(P )− Π(P ′′) =
(βT − βT+1)
(∑
i∈A
wiωi
)
+βT+1
(
wST (P ) − wST−1(P )
) ∑
i∈ST−1(P )
ωi +
∑
i∈S+
ωi

+βT+1
∑
i∈A+
ωi
(
wST (P ) − wi
)
+βT+1wST (P )
∑
i∈A
ωi
Moreover, P ∈ P a implies Π(P )− Π(P ′′) ≥ 0. Then,
∑
i∈A
wiωi ≥ β
1− β
(wST−1(P ) − wST (P ))
 ∑
i∈ST−1(P )
ωi +
∑
i∈S+
ωi

+
∑
i∈A+
ωi
(
wi − wST (P )
)
−wST (P )
∑
i∈A
ωi
]
.
(4)
Using Equations 3 and 4, we have
∑
i∈A
wiωi =
β
1− β
(wST−1(P ) − wST (P ))
 ∑
i∈ST−1(P )
ωi

−wST (P )
(∑
i∈A
ωi
)]
.
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And then, Π(P ) = Π(P ′) = Π(P ′′). Since, by assumption P ∈ P a, we have, P ′′ ∈ P a.
Moreover, it is straightforward to check that P ′′ satisﬁes ∀i ∈ N,∀t ∈ N,
1. i /∈ St(P ′′)⇒ p′′ti = w + δ,
2. t = 0⇒ [i ∈ St(P ′′)⇒ p′′ti = wi],
3. t > 0⇒ [i ∈ St(P ′′)⇒ p′′ti = min(wi,mint′<t,i′∈St′ (P ′′)wi′)].
Hence, P ′′ ∈ P ∗∗ ⊆ P ∗. Moreover, #T (P ′) < #T (P ) or [#T (P ′′) = #T (P ) and max{t <
m, [{i ∈ N,mi = t} = ∅ and St−1(P ) 6= St(P )]} < max{t < m, [{i ∈ N,mi = t} =
∅ and St−1(P ′′) 6= St(P ′′)]} contradicting the deﬁnition of P . 
Proof of Proposition 3: Follows directly from Lemma 11. 
Proof of Proposition 4: By Proposition 3, ∃P ∈ P a,∀t > 1, St(P ) = St−1(P ).
Obviously, by Lemma 7, S0(P ) = S(P ) ∈ S0. Let S ′ ∈ S0. Let P ′ = (p′t′i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be
deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ ∈ N, p′t′i′ =

wi′ , if i
′ ∈ S ′ and t′ = 0
wS′ , if i
′ ∈ S ′ and t′ > 0
m+ δ , otherwise
.
It is straightforward to check that
Π(P ′) =
∑
i∈S′
wiωi +
β
1− βwS′
(∑
i∈S′
ωi
)
.
Since, S ′ ∈ S0 and S ∈ S0, Π(P ) = Π(P ′). Hence, P ′ ∈ P a. Moreover, obviously,
S(P ′) = S ′. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Let P ∈ P a be such that S(P ) /∈ S0. By Lemma 6, P˜ ∈ P a
and by Lemma 5, S(P˜ ) /∈ S0. By Lemma 10, ∃P ′ ∈ P ∗, ∀t > 0, St−1(P ′) = St(P ′) = S(P˜ ).
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Then, by deﬁnition of P ∗,
Π(P ′) =
∑
i∈S(P˜ )
wiωi +
β
1− βwS(P˜ )
 ∑
i∈S(P˜ )
ωi
 .
With Proposition 4, P ′ ∈ P ∗ ⊆ P a and S(P˜ ) /∈ S0 is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Let P ∈ P a and let T ∈ N be the earliest period for which
ST (P ) = S(P ) and T > m. By Proposition 2, ∀S ∈ S0, S(P ) ⊂ S or S ⊆ S(P ). Assume
∀S ∈ S0, S(P ) ⊂ S. Let S ∈ S0.
By Lemmas 6 and 7, P˜ ∈ P a, T is the earliest period for which ST (P˜ ) = S(P˜ ) and
T > m. Moreover, S(P˜ ) ⊂ S. Let S+ = S \ S(P˜ ) 6= ∅.
Let P ′ = (p′t
′
i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ ∈ N, p′t′i′ =

wi , if i
′ ∈ S+ and t′ = T + 1
wS , if i
′ ∈ S and t′ > T + 1
p˜t
′
i′ , otherwise
.
It is straightforward to check that
Π(P˜ )− Π(P ′) =
= βT+1

 ∑
i∈S(P˜ )
wiωi
+ β
1− β
wS(P˜ ) ∑
i∈S(P˜ )
ωi

−
(∑
i∈S
wiωi
)
− β
1− β
(
wS
∑
i∈S
ωi
)]
By deﬁnition of S0 and since by assumption, S(P˜ ) /∈ S0,(∑
i∈S
wiωi
)
+
β
1− β
(
wS
∑
i∈S
ωi
)
>
 ∑
i∈S(P˜ )
wiωi
+ β
1− β
wS(P˜ ) ∑
i∈S(P˜ )
ωi
 .
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Hence, Pi(P˜ ) < Pi(P ′) contradicting the assumption that P˜ ∈ P a. 
Definition 7
Let the function pi be deﬁned as follows: ∀A ⊆ N ,
pi(A) =
∑
i∈A
ωiwi +
β
1− β
∑
i∈A
ωiwA.
Proof of Proposition 7: Let P = (pti)i∈N,t∈N ∈ P a be such that S(P ) /∈ S0. By Lemma
10, we can consider ∀t > 1, St−1 = St(P ). By Lemma 5 and 6, we can consider P ∈ P ∗. Let
us deﬁne A = S0(P ), A+ = {i ∈ N,wi ≥ wA} and B = S1(P ) \ A+. Then, by deﬁnition,
S(P ) = A+ ∪B. It is straightforward to check that
Π(P ) =
∑
i∈A
ωiwi + β
∑
i∈A+
ωi(wA+ − wi) + βpi(A+ ∪B).
Let S ∈ S0.
I. Assume A+ ⊆ S.
Let P ′ = (p′t
′
i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N,∀t′ ∈ N, p′t′i′ =

wi , if i
′ ∈ S \ A+ and t′ = 1
wS , if i
′ ∈ S and t′ > 1
pt
′
i′ , otherwise
.
It is straightforward to check that
Π(P ′) =
∑
i∈A
ωiwi + β
∑
i∈A+
ωi(wA − wi) + βpi(S).
Then, Π(P )− Π(p′) = pi(A+ ∪ B)− pi(S). However, S ∈ S0 and S(P ) = A+ ∪ B /∈ S0
imply Π(P )− Π(p′) = pi(A+ ∪B)− pi(S) < 0. This contradicts the fact that P ∈ P a.
II. Assume S ⊂ A+.
Let us deﬁne S0 = {i ∈ N,mi = 0}, S1 = {i ∈ S,wi ≥ wS0} and S2 = S \ S1.
Let P ′′ = (p′′t
′
i′)i′∈N,t′∈N ∈ P be deﬁned as:
∀i′ ∈ N, ∀t′ ∈ N, p′′t′i′ =

wi , if i
′ ∈ S0 and t′ = 0
wS0 , if i
′ ∈ S1 and t′ = 1
wi , if i
′ ∈ S2 and t′ = 1
wS , if i
′ ∈ S and t′ > 1
w + δ , otherwise
.
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It is straightforward to check that
Π(P ′′) =
∑
i∈S0
ωiwi + β
∑
i∈S1
ωi(wS0 − wi) + βpi(S).
Further,
Π(P )− Π(P ′′) =∑
S\S0
wiωi −
∑
A+\A
wiωi
−β
(∑
i∈S1
ωi(wS0 − wS) +
∑
i∈S2
ωi(wi − wS)
)
+β(pi(A+ ∪B)− pi(S)) + (1− β)(pi(A+)− pi(S)).
S ∈ S0 and S(P ) = A+∪B /∈ S0 imply pi(A+∪B)−pi(S) < 0 S ∈ S0 implies pi(A+)−pi(S) ≤
0. By the deﬁnitions
∑
i∈S1 ωi(wS0 − wS) +
∑
i∈S2 ωi(wi − wS) ≥ 0. Finally, by deﬁnition,
S ⊂ A+ implies S \ S0 = {i ∈ S,mi = 1} ⊆ A+ \ A = {i ∈ A+,mi = 1}. Hence,∑
S\S0 wiωi −
∑
A+\Awiωi ≤ 0. Then, Π(P ) − Π(P ′′) < 0 which contradicts the fact that
P ∈ P a. 
Proof of Proposition 8: The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 7 with weak
inequalities. 
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